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Hyatt: Hyatt: Evidence-Attorney-Client
for Communications [Vol. 42
MISSOURI LAW Privilege
REVIEW

Another basis for interdistrict relief, also suggested in Milliken, 52 is provided when the suburban school districts to be included in the desegregation plan are themselves engaged in unconstitutional conduct which affects
the urban district.3 In those states where segregation was formerly required or permitted by law, such violations may be common. In other
states, where the equal protection clause requires a threshold showing of
purposeful state action, success is less likely.54 Nevertheless, this theory
provides the strongest basis for a metropolitan remedy because it involves
no interference with the autonomy of innocent local communities.
The new equal protection standard will not halt the search for interdistrict relief; it merely will make the search more difficult. The final resolution of the protracted litigation in Board of School Commissioners will indicate the degree of that difficulty. However, the ultimate success of metropolitan desegregation will depend less upon judicial refinement of equal
protection analysis than upon popular commitment to a racially integrated
society.
CHRISTOPHER F. JONES

EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN INSURER
AND INSURED IN MISSOURI
l
State ex rel. Cain v. Barker

Defendant Cain was driving a truck on behalf of his employer when he
struck a camper driven by Miller. Miller died of injuries resulting from the
collision and his widow subsequently brought a wrongful death action
1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S.Ct. 800-02 (1977); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975);
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).

52. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
53. Some courts have suggested that an interdistrict remedy is permissible
only if each district is in violation of the Constitution. Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 939 (1975); Hiett v. Biondi, 389 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D.

Tex. 1975). Another court has concluded that if each district is in violation of the

Constitution, no interdistrict violation is necessary. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
However, both interpretations appear inconsistent with the language in Milliken.
54: The United States, in Board of School Comm'rs, might have attempted proof

that suburban resistance to both consolidation with the Indianapolis School District
and the location of public housing outside the school district was racially motivated.
Both patterns of opposition perpetuated segregation within the school district.
1. 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
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against the defendant. At the time of the accident, insurance policies
provided liability coverage to defendant's employer and to defendant himself. On two occasions immediately following the accident, the insurance
adjuster representing the liability insurer took detailed statements from
defendant concerning the accident. Approximately six months later, attorneys for the plaintiff in the wrongful death action took defendant's deposition. At the deposition, however, defendant was unable to answer numerous questions because his memory of the accident was not fresh. Plaintiff
moved to have the trial court order defendant to produce the statements
he had given his insurer, arguing substantial need for the information
2
sought.
When the judge ordered defendant to produce the statements for
inspection and copying, defendant filed for a writ of prohibition. Defendant claimed that the statements were protected by the attorney-client
privilege and were, therefore, not discoverable.3 Plaintiff, on the other
hand, argued that the statements were subject to discovery as the work
product of the insurer's attorney.4 The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege and issued
5
the writ.
2. The motion was based on Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) which deals with trial
preparation materials and which reads in part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this Rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
3. The defendant's petition was based on Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3), see rule
quoted note 1 supra, and on Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(1) which reads in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents or other
tangible things .

. .

. (emphasis added).

4. See rule quoted in note 2 supra.
5. 540 S.W.2d at 53. In holding the statements were privileged, the court
determined that it need not address the problem of whether such statements were
subject to discovery as work product as had been suggested by the plaintiff. Under
the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure any matter that is privileged is not subject to
discovery. See rule quoted in note 3 supra. However, Chief Judge Seiler, dissenting,
rejected the extension of the attorney-client privilege to include statements made by
an insured to his insurer. 540 S.W.2d at 58. He urged that the court follow the
federal approach in which such statements are not regarded as falling within the
attorney-client privilege. Instead such statements are examined in terms of work
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/9

2

644

Hyatt: Hyatt: Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege for Communications
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 42

The privileged nature of a communication between a client and his
attorney is based upon the desirability of encouraging a client's free disclosure to his counsel. 6 Although traditionally a confidential communication
from a client directly to his lawyer was required for the privilege, 7 the
doctrine has been extended to include communications to the attorney
through his intermediate clerks and agents.' That extension is based on the
practical necessity in most legal offices to rely on clerks, secretaries, and
agents in conducting legal business with clients. 9 As part of this extension,
most jurisdictions now hold that a statement or report made by an insured
to his insurer, dealing with an accident that may be the basis for a claim
against him which is covered by the policy, is a privileged communication. 10
product for discovery purposes. See, e.g., McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (4th
Cir. 1972); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Dingler v. Halcyon Lijn N.V., 50 F.R.D. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1970);Tinder v. McGowan, 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1608 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Whitaker v. Davis,
45 F.R.D. 270 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Burns v. New York Central R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309
(N.D. Ohio 1963); Dennhardt v. Holman, 12 F.R.D. 79 (D. Colo. 1951); Matthies v.
Peter F. Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F.
Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
6. For a general discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege and
the policy behind it, see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 87, 89 (2d ed. 1972).
7. Professor Wigmore's widely recognized conditions necessary to establish
the attorney-client'privilege include the conditions that "the communications must
originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed" and that "confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship
between the parties." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D.
Del. 1954) (attorney-client privilege is a communication made by the client to a
lawyer or his immediate subordinates who habitually report to the attorney); Tyler
v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313, 17 S.W. 319 (1891) (privilege is confined to counsel and to
clerks who serve as media of communication between client and counsel). See
generally Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 125 (1964); Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of
Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 U. DET. L.J. 1 (1964). It should be noted that a communication through one who is not the attorney's agent or a communication in the
presence of a third party will defeat the attorney-client privilege. See also Seeger v.
Odell, 64 Cal. App. 2d 397, 148 P.2d 901 (1944); State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 278
S.W.2d 737 (Mo. En Banc 1955); Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96, 242 S.W. 94 (En
Banc 1922); In re Cunnion's Will, 201 N.Y. 123, 94 N.E. 648 (1911); Minard v.
Stillman, 31 Or. 164, 49 P. 976 (1897); Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1964).
9. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 693, 177 S.E. 582, 583 (1934). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 91 (2d ed. 1972).

10. See Gene Compton's Corp. v. Cochrane, 205 Cal. App. 2d 365, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 250 (1962); Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339
P.2d 567 (1959); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956); Grand Union Co. v.
Patrick, 247 So. 2d 474 (Fla. App. 1971); People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d
15 (1964); Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973); Hollien v. Kaye,
194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Westminster Airways Ltd. v.
Kuwait Oil Co., [1951] 1 K.B. 134 (C.A.); cf. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 111. 2d 351,
221 N.E.2d 410 (1966) (where both parties to the action have the same insurer,
statements given to the insurer by one party before he retains independent counsel
are not protected because the element of confidentiality is lacking); Brasseaux v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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Prior to the Cain decision, Missouri courts had not reached a definitive
rule in insurer-insured cases." In Cain the supreme court acknowledged
that numerous courts in other states had supported the rule extending the
privilege.1" The Missouri court quoted extensively from opinions of courts
in Illinois"5 and New York 4 to explain the rationale for the rule and
indicated that it adopted those rationales. 5 The Illinois court reasoned that
although communications from insured to insurer are normally made to a
layman, and in many cases a lawyer is never retained, the terms of most
liability insurance policies delegate the selection of an attorney and the
conduct of the defense to the insurer. If litigation results, the insurer's
attorneys handle the case and proceed on the basis of information furnished them by the insurer.16 Under these circumstances the insured may
assume that any communication to the representative of his insurer is in
fact made to the insurer as a potential agent who will transmit it to an
attorney for the protection of the insured.' 7
The New York court based its adoption of the insurer-insured
privilege on the fact that most automobile insurance contracts call for full
and prompt reports of accidents to the insurer. Public policy demands that
parties to an agreement perform their contractual promises, and it follows
that the rules of discovery should encourage the insured to make a full and
prompt report to his insurance carrier."8 If such statements could be used
against the insured in a lawsuit, he would naturally be discouraged from
making a prompt and full report of an accident. Thus, in order to effect a
Girouard, 253 La. 60, 214 So. 2d 401 (1968) (the privilege is not necessarily
applicable when the issue is adequate cooperation between insured and insurer's
counsel); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957); Kandel v. Tocher, 22
App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1965); Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 160
Misc. 658, 290 N.Y.S. 483 (New York Mun. Ct. 1936) (statement transmitted to
attorney through insurance representative may be privileged, but failure to object
to its admission into evidence waives the privilege); Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.,
139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y.S. 631 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951) (the privileged nature of statements
made to insurer, as with other privileges, is lost through voluntary disclosure to
others); Lantex Constr. Co. v. Lejsal, 315 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958). See
generally cases compiled in Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 659 (1952); 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 193 (1976). Contra, Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964)
(statements made to insurer are not privileged unless an action has already been
commenced against the insured).
11. In Hutchinson v. Steinke, 353 S.W.2d 137 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962), the
court assumed, without deciding, that such a statement was privileged, finding it
did not have to decide the issue because the party seeking its admission into
evidence did not dispute its privileged nature.
12. 540 S.W.2d at 50.
13. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
14. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
15. 540 S.W.2d at 54.
16. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 461, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964).
17. Id.

18. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821,825, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/9
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desired public policy, such statements should be exempt from use by the
other party.
There are indications that the court in Cain limited the insurerinsured doctrine so that not all statements from an insured to his insurer
are exempt from discovery. The court expressly stated that the insurerinsured relationship must exist at the time of the statements in order for
them to be privileged. 9 The defendant's attorneys claimed their law firm
had been selected by the carrier prior to the defendant's initial statements
to the insurance company representative." That point was disputed by the
plaintiff but the supreme court said that it was unnecessary to decide
precisely when the attorneys entered the case.21 Instead the court stated
that regardless of whether an attorney had actually been contacted, if it was
clear that an insurer-insured relationship existed at the time of the statements, they fall within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. 22 A
rule that did not require the existence of at least the insurer-insured
relationship would be inconsistent with the New York policy of encouraging the contractual obligation of full and prompt disclosure2 3 which the
Missouri Supreme Court adopted. That rationale presupposes the existence of a contractual insurer-insured relationship.
It also appears from Cain that the insurance contract may have to
contain an obligation on the part of the insurer to defend actions against
the insured for the statements to qualify for the insurer-insured privilege.
Although the court never specifically articulated this limitation, the court
quoted extensively from the Illinois24 and New York 5 courts which do
require the clause containing an obligation to defend. 2' A requirement that
the insurance contract have a clause to defend is an outgrowth of justifying
the insurer-insured privilege by viewing the insurer as a potential agent for
an attorney that the insurer will retain. Unless there is a clause requiring
19. 540 S.W.2d at 53.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821,825, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
24. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
25. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
26. The court also phrased the rule in question by quoting from 22 A.L.R.2d
659, 660 (1952) and 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 194, at 228 (1976), both of which
included the phrase "if the policy requires the company to defend him." 540
S.W.2d at 54. Additionally, although there is no firm indication either in the
majority opinion or in the briefs of the parties that Cain's policy did in fact contain
such a clause, Judge Bardgett, concurring, does refer to the specific factual situation presented by the case as involving an obligation to defend the insured. 540
S.W.2d at 58. Although most cases stating the general rule specifically say the
contract must contain an obligation to defend, there are a few cases that do not
phrase the rule as containing that condition. See, e.g., Phillips v. Delaware Power &
Light Co., 56 Del. 533, 194 A.2d 690 (1963); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2
N.W.2d 413 (1942); In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); In re
Heile, 65 Ohio App. 45, 29 N.E.2d 175 (1939).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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defense by the insurer, the insurer will never hire an attorney and, thus,
will never become an attorney's agent.
The Missouri court did not deal with the question of whether the
privilege will be limited to cases in which the defendant is the one who is
specifically named in the insurance policy. In Cain, the defendant was a
"named insured." Here again, in discussing the doctrine, the court relied
solely upon cases in which the defendant was named in the policy. 27 Thus,
it seems po ;sible that the doctrine may not be applied, for example, in a
case where the defendant is an employee covered generally by his employer's liability insurance policy but is not specifically named in that policy.28
The court in Cain indicated in dicta that the insurer-insured privilege
can be waived, a further limitation on the doctrine. The plaintiff contended that the defendant had waived the privilege because he had denied
liability in his answer, would be expected to testify at trial, and, thus, should
have to produce the statements in advance of trial in accord with State ex rel.
McNutt v. Keet. 29 McNutt held that a plaintiff is considered to have waived
the physician-patient privilege when his physical condition is at issue under
his pleadings.3 0 The McNutt result is based on the fact that a plaintiff who is
pleading personal injuries will have to testify at trial about his injuries and
his subsequent treatment for them. Additionally, a plaintiff must ordinarily
call his doctor to the stand to testify about the injuries. Either by testifying
himself about medical treatment and medical advice or by having his
doctor testify, the plaintiff waives the privilege surrounding communications with his physician."1 Thus, the plaintiff necessarily waives the medical
privilege at trial in order to place evidence about his injuries before the
court. The McNutt court reasoned that if the privilege was not considered
waived until trial it would be unfair to the defendant and a continuance
would be necessary at that point to allow the defendant to discover matters
27. See People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964); Hollien v. Kaye,
194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
28. It should be noted that Judges Bardgett and Morgan concurred, provided
that the doctrine be limited to the facts of this case. 540 S.W.2d 50 at 58.
29. 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
30. For a general discussion of McNutt, see Toney, Waiver of the PhysicianPatient Privilege in Missouri, 34 Mo. L. REV. 397 (1969); Comment, Waiver of the
Physician-PatientPrivilege in Missouri, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 459 (1969).
31. For cases holding there is waiver of the privilege where plaintiff testifies as
to treatment, advice, or what the doctor told him, see, e.g., Blankenbaker v. St.
Louis & S.F.R., 274 Mo. 686, 187 S.W. 840 (1916); Epstein v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
250 Mo. 1, 156 S.W. 699 (En Banc 1913); Highfill v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 93 Mo. App.
219 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902). See also Demonbrun v. McHaffie, 348 Mo. 1120, 156
S.W.2d 923 (1941). For cases holding there is waiver when plaintiff calls the treating
physician to testify as to the treatment, see, e.g., Demonbrun v. McHaffie, 348 Mo.
1120, 156 S.W.2d 923 (1941); Wells v. City of Jefferson, 345 Mo. 239, 132 S.W.2d
1006 (1939); State v. Long, 257 Mo. 199, 165 S.W. 748 (En Banc 1914); Epstein v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S.W. 699 (En Banc 1913); Carrington v. City of
St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1 S.W. 240 (1886); Oliver v. Aylor, 173 Mo. App. 323, 158
S.W. 733 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/9
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formerly not discoverable because of the medical privilege. 2 To avoid this
undesirable result, the waiver is considered effective whenever a plaintiff
pleads personal injuries and those injuries are in dispute."3 The defendprivileged matters where personal
ant can, therefore, discover medically
34
injuries are pleaded and disputed.
The Cain court held that the privilege was not waived in this case
because, unlike McNutt, the party asserting the privilege here was the
defendant. Had the party asserting the privilege been the plaintiff, the
court stated, the McNutt waiver result would have followed.3 5 The court
reasoned that McNutt was decided as it was because, by his status as
plaintiff, a party indicates an intention to waive the privilege. As previously
discussed, this is true in the medical privilege case where the plaintiff
pleads personal injuries. But it does not logically follow that a plaintiff
similarly waives the attorney-client privilege with his pleadings. Unlike the
case where the plaintiff pleads his own injuries and must testify to medically privileged information to prove them, it cannot be said with certainty
that a plaintiff will be forced at trial to testify as to the substance of his
communications with his attorney in order to prove his case.
The attorney-client privilege will be waived under certain circumstances,3 6 and it is, of course, waived when the client testifies to the substance of the communication. 7 However, there is no inevitability that he
32. State ex rel. McNutt v. State, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
33. Id.
34. Id. The court in McNutt pointed out that the scope of the waiver involved
in that case did not automatically extend "to every doctor or hospital record a party
has from birth" but is limited to those matters that bear on the issues in the law suit.
432 S.W.2d at 602. However, it has been suggested that once the privilege is waived,
other medical evidence can be introduced if it is reasonably connected to the
condition.in issue. See Toney, supra note 30, at 406; Peterson, The Patient-Physician
Privilege in Missouri, 20 K.C.L. REV. 122, 133 (1952).
35. 540 S.W.2d at 57.
36. The privilege may be waived only by the client, either expressly or impliedly. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. 175 (1865); Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Schetter v. Schetter, 239 So. 2d 51 (Fla. App. 1970);
Passmore v. Passmore's Estate, 50 Mich. 626, 16 N.W. 170 (1883); Riddles v. Aiken,
29 Mo. 453 (1860); Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 S.W. 1101 (1922); State v.
Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). It may be waived expressly when the
client instructs the attorney to reveal the confidential information. See, e.g.,
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); Phillips v. Chase, 20 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755 (1909); Koeber v. Somers, 108
Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1901). It may be waived by failure to object. See, e.g.,
Reagan v. Aiken, 138 U.S. 109 (1891); Hepker v. Schmickle, 209 Iowa 744, 229
N.W. 177 (1930).

37. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Steen v. First Nat'l Bank,
298 F. 36 (8th Cir. 1924); Tripp v. Chubb, 69 Ariz. 31,208 P.2d 312 (1949); Toney
v. Raines, 224 Ark. 692, 275 S.W.2d 771 (1955); Sholine v. Harris, 22 Colo. App.
63, 123 P. 339 (1912); People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914); Johnson
v. State, 479 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. 1972); Whiteside v. Court of Honor, 231 S.W. 1026
(St. L. Mo. App. 1921); Pinson v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 260, 101 S.W. 621 (St. L.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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will do so merely on the basis of his pleadings."8 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have held that the client does not waive the privilege
merely by bringing an action or by testifying generally in his own behalf.3 9
Thus, even had the party in Cain been in court as a plaintiff, the attorneyclient privilege should not have been waived until he actually took the stand
and testified to the substance of the communication with his attorney. The
dicta in Cain that indicates that a party, by being a plaintiff, waives the
Ct. App. 1907); Kantaris v. Kantaris, 169 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1969); Cranston v.
Stewart, 184 Kan. 99, 334 P.2d 337 (1959); Janssen v. Kohler, 71 N.D. 247, 299
N.W. 900 (1941).
38. The rare situation in which a client might waive the attorney-client
privilege in his pleadings is in cases where the client alleges fraud or other improper
or unprofessional conduct on the part of his attorney, stemming from the communication the client later asserts as privileged. Even in thesecases, however, courts
generally wait until the client testifies to the substance of the statement in his own
behalf before finding waiver of the privileged nature of such communications. See,
e.g., Fearnley v. Fearnley, 44 Colo. 417, 98 P. 819 (1908) (court found waiver in
defendant's answer charging her attorney with fraud but also in her testimony as to
the substance of the communication with her attorney); Leverich v. Leverich, 340
Mich. 133, 64 N.W.2d 567 (1954) (where client alleged improper advice from
counsel resulted in an unfair property settlement, the court held once she had
testified as to the communication with her attorney she had waived the privilege);
Chase v. Chase, 78 R.I. 278, 81 A.2d 686 (1951) (court found waiver of the privilege
in publication of the communication with counsel in addition to charges of improper conduct); McClure v. Fall, 42 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931) (waiver found in
plaintiff's pleadings and testimony sufficient to allow plaintiff's attorney to testify
regarding the privileged communication); Smith v. Guerre, 159 S.W. 417 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1913) (court found waiver in pleadings and testimony by client alleging
improper conduct; however the privilege was not waived as to communications that
did not involve the conduct of the attorney that was allegedly improper); Grant v.
Harris, 116 Va. 642, 82 S.E. 718 (1914) (client waived the privilege in her pleadings
and by her own testimony so that attorneys must be allowed to testify for their own
protection).
39. See, e.g., Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112 (1873); Barker v. Kuhn, 38 Iowa
392 (1874); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950); Shelley v. Landry,
97 N.H. 27,79 A.2d 626 (1951); People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327,
244 N.E.2d 29 (1968); Ex parte Bryant, 106 Or. 359, 210 P. 454 (1922); Raleigh &
C.R.R. v. Jones, 104 S.C. 332, 88 S.E. 896 (1916); see also cases compiled in Annot.,
51 A.L.R.2d 521 (1952). But see Knowlton v. Fourth-Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 264 Mass.
181, 162 N.E. 356 (1928) (where plaintiff apparently did testify to the content of the
privileged communication, the court used very broad language to indicate that a
voluntary witness waives every privilege). Early Ohio cases interpreting a statutory
directive indicated waiver of all privileges by a plaintiff who voluntarily testifies in
his own behalf. See Spitzer v. Stillings, 109 Ohio St. 297, 142 N.E. 365 (1924). But
see Foley v. Poschke, 66 Ohio App. 227, 32 N.E.2d 858 (1940), aff'd, 137 Ohio St.
593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941) (indicating that without directly overruling earlier cases
the court would find no waiver unless plaintiff testified to the content of the
confidential communication); Mastran Constr. Co. v. Mahoning Express Co., 58
Ohio L. Abs. 196, 96 N.E.2d 30 (1950) (again without directly overruling earlier
cases, the court held it would follow the common law rule and settled law that the
attorney-client privilege remains intact even when the client is a witness in his own
behalf).
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